Colorado Must Reconsider the Imprisonment of Tina Peters

By Rep. Ken DeGraaf | Guest Commentary, Rocky Mountain Voice

The case of former Mesa County Clerk and Recorder Tina Peters has become one of the most controversial legal and political episodes in modern Colorado election administration. But stripped of partisan rhetoric and competing narratives, the core issue before the public is far simpler—and far more troubling.

Should an election official who believed she was preserving federally required election records spend years in prison for a disputed administrative decision?

That question deserves serious reflection from every Coloradan, regardless of political affiliation.

Public confidence in elections depends not only on accurate vote counts but on transparency in the systems that produce those results. When officials believe records may be altered or lost, preserving those records should not be treated as a crime. Whether one ultimately agrees with Peters’ conclusions or not, the punishment imposed raises profound questions about proportional justice, due process, and the future willingness of election officials to raise legitimate concerns.

This case is fundamentally about record preservation and the rule of law—not the outcome of any election.

Under federal law, election officials are required to preserve election records for twenty-two months following a federal election. The relevant statute, 52 U.S.C. § 20701, requires that election officers retain and preserve “all records and papers… relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting.” Federal guidance has consistently interpreted this requirement broadly to include digital records, system logs, and electronic audit trails generated by voting systems.

In other words, if a voting system produces data related to the election process, that data is expected to be preserved.

Yet evidence indicating that election system records may have been overwritten during a system rebuild—evidence supported by forensic reports and expert testimony—was not fully examined during Peters’ trial. According to court proceedings, key materials that could have supported her defense were excluded from consideration.

That raises serious concerns under the due-process principles established in Brady v. Maryland, which requires prosecutors to disclose evidence favorable to the defense when it may affect the outcome of a case.

The broader legal issue also involves the relationship between federal and state law. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal statutes take precedence when state administrative procedures conflict with federal obligations. If an election official reasonably believed that system records required preservation under federal law, the act of creating a forensic backup could be interpreted as an attempt to comply with federal requirements—not circumvent them.

The technical standards governing voting systems reinforce that expectation of preservation. The federal Voting System Standards require that election systems maintain a complete audit trail documenting system activity. These audit trails are intended to serve as permanent archival records of election processes.

That means the systems themselves are designed to record and preserve operational data.

If such records were at risk of being overwritten during a system rebuild—often referred to as a “Trusted Build”—preserving a forensic copy could reasonably be viewed as a safeguard rather than an intrusion.

This is where the Peters case becomes deeply troubling.

Peters did not damage voting equipment. No evidence demonstrated that votes were altered or election outcomes changed. Instead, the case centered on the process by which she allowed a technical consultant to assist in creating a forensic image of the system.

The state’s prosecution framed the action as unauthorized system access. Peters’ defense argued it was an effort to preserve election records in accordance with federal law.

That distinction matters enormously because criminal convictions generally require proof of intent.

In most criminal cases, prosecutors must demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intentionally committed a wrongful act. Yet the circumstances surrounding Peters’ actions strongly suggest a good-faith belief that she was fulfilling her duties as an elected election official responsible for maintaining records and overseeing election systems.

Even those who disagree with Peters’ conclusions about election systems should recognize the danger of criminalizing administrative decisions made under a reasonable belief that the law required record preservation.

When government officials face the possibility of prison for raising concerns about system integrity, future officials may simply remain silent.

That outcome would not strengthen elections. It would weaken them.

Public trust depends on transparency, accountability, and the willingness of institutions to withstand scrutiny. A system often described as the “gold standard” should welcome careful examination rather than punish those who attempt to preserve records for review.

The severity of Peters’ sentence has also raised concerns well beyond election administration circles. Observers across the political spectrum have noted that the punishment imposed for non-violent administrative actions appears unusually harsh when compared with other cases involving public officials.

Even Jared Polis has acknowledged that Peters’ sentence appears severe.

That acknowledgment matters because the Colorado Constitution explicitly provides the governor with clemency authority precisely for circumstances like this. Under Article IV Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution, the governor may grant pardons or commutations when justice and the public interest warrant it.

Clemency does not require declaring a defendant innocent or overturning a court verdict. Instead, it allows the executive branch to address cases where punishment appears disproportionate or where broader public confidence in the justice system is at stake.

The Peters case presents exactly that kind of moment.

Granting clemency would not predetermine the outcome of the questions surrounding election system records. It would not validate or invalidate Peters’ concerns about election technology. Instead, it would acknowledge that imprisoning a 70-year-old public official for disputed administrative actions does little to strengthen public trust.

In fact, it risks doing the opposite.

When citizens see election officials imprisoned for attempting to preserve records, many conclude that transparency itself has become dangerous.

Colorado should reject that message.

Public confidence in election administration depends on openness, accountability, and the willingness to investigate legitimate concerns—even when those concerns prove unfounded. Allowing questions about record preservation to be examined independently would strengthen trust in Colorado’s election system rather than weaken it.

For these reasons, Governor Polis should exercise his constitutional clemency authority and grant Tina Peters either a full pardon or unconditional commutation of her sentence. Doing so would demonstrate that Colorado values transparency, proportional justice, and the principle that good-faith efforts to safeguard public records should never be treated as criminal acts.

In extraordinary circumstances such as this, the constitutional clemency power exists so that mercy and justice can prevail when rigid adherence to punishment no longer serves the public interest.

Colorado’s election system—and the public trust that sustains it—would be stronger for it.

Rep. Ken DeGraaf represents House District 22 in northeast Colorado Springs and has served in the Colorado House since 2023. He’s a 27-year U.S. Air Force veteran and pilot, a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and holds a master’s in structural dynamics from Columbia University.

Editor’s note: Opinions expressed in commentary pieces are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the management of the Rocky Mountain Voice, but even so we support the constitutional right of the author to express those opinions.