Colorado Springs vs. Huntsville: what’s next for Space Command HQ?

By Jamie McIntyre | Washington Examiner

One of the longest-running battles in Washington is not over the war in Ukraine or the wisdom of tariffs and tax cuts but rather a war between two states over whether Space Command headquarters should remain in Colorado, where it is and always has been since its predecessor, the Air Force Space Command, was established in 1982, or move to Huntsville, Alabama, where it would be the crown jewel of “Rocket City,” home of the Army’s Redstone Arsenal.

When President Donald Trump created the Space Force at the end of 2019 during his first term, Colorado’s newly renamed Peterson Space Force Base was, as logic would dictate, named the temporary headquarters of what was now a full-fledged combatant command, while a formal Air Force review determined the best permanent location.

Sixty-six communities from all 50 states were invited to make their case, and eventually the field was narrowed to six finalists.

In a White House meeting just nine days before Trump left office in 2021, Alabama was named as the preferred location, pending an environmental review.

Colorado’s lawmakers were shocked, as the selection criteria seemed to undervalue the state’s advantages, while overstating Alabama’s.

Immediately, the process was tainted by suspicion that it was a political reward to deep-red Alabama, which went for Trump in the 2020 presidential election, as opposed to Colorado, which, while having a significant Republican constituency, did not.

Trump reinforced the perception that the selection was highly politicized when he crowed in an August 2021 radio interview that he directed the headquarters to move to Alabama.

“They were looking for a home and I single-handedly said, ‘Let’s go to Alabama,’” Trump said in a phone interview. “They wanted it. I said, ‘Let’s go to Alabama.” I love Alabama.”

From that point on, politics infused every aspect of the debate.

Then-President Joe Biden requested a review of the decision, and 17 months after he took office, a June 2022 Government Accountability Office report found no evidence of direct political interference. However, it noted that the Air Force failed to follow “best practices” in evaluating 14 of the 21 site selection criteria, which, the GAO concluded, led to “significant shortfalls in its transparency and credibility.”

But Biden also did something that Trump did not. He asked his top generals, including the then-commander of Space Command, Army Gen. James Dickinson, for their best military advice.

Dickinson, in particular, said moving to Alabama would be a mistake. It would delay the vital command from reaching full operational capability and result in a brain drain because most of the civilian employees at SPACECOM had no interest in moving to Alabama.

A Defense Department inspector general report released in April confirmed that while the Air Force weighed lower construction costs in Alabama as the “primary driver” of its preference for Redstone Arsenal, the military leadership “prioritized minimizing the risk to readiness.”

Biden was getting conflicting advice.

Alabama was cheaper and the choice of his civilian Air Force secretary, Frank Kendall, while Colorado was recommended by Dickinson.

In May, the GAO issued a revised report that was highly critical of the Air Force for disregarding several of the most critical factors that should have weighed heavily in favor of not moving to Alabama: the delay in reaching full operational capability, the advantage of being collocated with the U.S. Northern Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command, and the challenge of training a whole new civilian workforce from scratch.

Having SPACECOM in Colorado Springs would provide Space Command “with critical redundancy that would take considerable resources to recreate in other candidate locations,” according to the report.

Instead, the GAO found, the Air Force criteria put more weight on other factors such as “parking and facility square footage,” which, according to the GAO, were unrealistically low because they were based on an outdated assumption that Space Command would have only 1,450 authorized personnel instead of the 1,800 personnel projected to be needed.

While the GAO recommended the Air Force consider “disruption to operational capability” as one of the criteria for assessing the risk of moving to Alabama, “the Air Force did not weight this criterion,” according to the GAO, “because it decided to rely on its original selection criteria for making the selection.”

“The Air Force placed considerable weight on the projected cost savings,” while minimizing the risks to maintaining operational readiness, which it believed could be easily mitigated, according to the report, while, in contrast, Dickinson “expressed the view that operational risk was significant.”

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